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In 
The Supreme <9ourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
CARL JOHANSON and CLARA J. 
JOHANSON, His Wife1 
Appellants 
CUDAHY PACKING COMPANY, a 
Corporation, 
Respondent. 
Appeal From the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County 
Honorable M. J. Bronson, Judge 
Appellants' Abstract and Brief 
An order was heretofore made hy the Court p~r­
mitting appellants to combine their abstract and 
brief. The appeal in this cause is tak8n fron1 an 
order of the District Court of Salt Lake County 
sustaining a general demurrer and dismissing plain-
tiffs' complaint. The abstract of the record v;ill in-
clude only the material pleadings. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
ABSTRACT OF RECORD 
COMPLAINT 
(TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE). 
1 Plaintiffs complain of the defendant and for 
cause of action allege : 
1. 
That plaintiffs herein are the father ana 
mother of one Robert- Johanson, deceased, and 
are the only heirs at law of the said decedent. 
2. 
That the defendant is a corporation of the State 
of Maine
1 
duly authorized to do and transact 
business within the State of Utah, and is en-
gaged in the general meat packing business 
and has its plant at North Salt Lake, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
3. 
That at all times hereinafter mentioned the 
said Robert Johanson was an employee of the 
Royal Crystal Salt Company, which operates 
its plant and business near the highway approx-
imately ten 1niles west of Salt Lake City, 
Utah; that on the 3rd day of June, 1938, at 
approximately the hour of 7:45 o'clock A.M. of 
said date, the saiq Robert Johanson and one 
Raleigh Johnson, a fellow employee, were 
directed by their employer to deliver a truck 
load of salt of about ten tons to the plant of 
the defendant herein, in pursuance of an order 
made by the said defendant to the Royal Crystal 
Salt Company; that the delivery of said order 
was made in it large steel body closed-in truck, 
the top of virhich was approximately eleven feet 
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from the ground, and w·hich had two doors in 
the rear thereof opening outward. 
4. 
That pursuant to the direction of his employer 
the said Robert Johanson) together with the 
said Raleig1h Johnson, drove said truck load 
of salt to the plant of the defendant herein and 
upon arrival at said plant the foreman of de-
fendant's plant (whose name is tq the plain-
tiff unknown, but whom plaintiff is advised is 
named Griffith), whQ at said time and place 
'vas acting in the course of his employment, 
directed the said Robert Johanson and the said 
Raleigh Johnson to deliver said salt to the com-
pany's ice plant, which is situated in the rear 
of the main building of defendant company's 
plant. That in order to reach said ice plant 
it was necessary to back said truck through an 
alleyway which was only Wide enough to per-
mit said truck to pass through and which had 
buildings on either side thereof tor a distance 
of approximately 140 feet to the platform of 
said ice plant, which platform extended to said 
alleyway from the rear of said ice plant 
huilding. 
5. 
That there had theretofore been stretched 
across said alleyway a seri?s of tl1ree · wires, 
'v~·lich carried a higl1 and dangerous voltage of 
p]ectricity, to wit: 440 volts, immediately east 
of the platform hereinbefore referred to, and 
defendant had careles~;ly and negligently per-
mitted said wires to become out of repair, so 
that th-e same sagged down into said alleyway 
to such an extent as to make it impossible to 
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operate said truck along said alleyway without 
coming into contact with said wires, all of which 
facts were well known to the ·defendant, or in 
the exercise of reasonable care could have been 
known to it; that the defendant, knowing the 
presence of said wires and the sa~ging condition 
thereof, carelessly and negligently failed to 
advise the said Robert Johanson ana the said 
Raleigh Johnson of the presence of said wires 
and of the high voltag~e of electricity carried 
therein, and carele-ssly and negligently directed 
the said Robert Johanson and the said Raleigh 
Johnson to back said truck along said alleyway 
and the said Robert Johanson and the said 
Raleigh Johnson, without knowledge- of said 
wires or that the same had sagged down so that 
said truck would come in contact therewith, and 
without knowledge that said wires were charged 
with a high and dangerous voltage of electri-
city, pursuant to defendant's direction, backed 
said truck along said alleyway and against said 
wires, whereby and by reason whereof said 
truck became charged with a high voltage of 
electricity, and the said Robert Johanson, not 
knowing ·of the presence of said wiTes and that 
the same had come in contact with said truck 
and had charged the body of said truck with a 
high voltage of electricity, went to the rear of 
said truck and took hold of the handle of the 
door thereof to open the same; that as the said 
Robert Johanson took hold of said handle a 
large voltage of electricity passed through his 
body, killing him instantly. 
6. 
That the said Robert Johanson was a strong 
nnd able-bodied man of the age of twenty-eight 
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5 
years and was earning frmn his employment 
approximately one hund1·ed and fifty dollars 
per n1onth, of which su1n he was contributing 
the sum of sixty dollars per month to the sup-
port of his parents, Carl J oha.nson and Clara 
J. Johanson, who are old and infirm and have 
no income or property of their own, and who 
were dependent upon the said decedent for their 
support; that at the time of the death of the 
said Robert Johanson, as aforesaid, he was liv-
ing with the said plaintiffs at their home in 
Grantsville, Utah. 
7. 
That the death of the said Robert Johanson 
was the direct and proximate resU:1t of theJ 
carelessness and negligence of the defendant, 
as hereinbefore set forth, all to the injury and 
damage of the plaintiffs herein in the sum of 
Two Thousand Nine Hundred and Fifty Dol-
lars ($2,950.00). 
8. 
That at the time of the occurrence hereinbefore 
mentioned, the Royal Crystal Salt Company 
was insured under Utah vVorlunen's Compen-
sation Act with the London Guarantee & Acci-
dent Company, Ltd.; that after the death of 
said Robert Johanson, the plaintiffs herein 
applied to the Industrial Commission of Utah 
and were awarded compensation under said la \\' 
in the sum of approximately $2,500.00, hy rea-
son of which the said London Guarantee & Acci-
dent Company, Ltd., became subrogated to the 
rights of the plaintiffs herein in said cause 
of action again~t the defendant, under the pro-
visions of Section 42-1-58, Revised Statutes of 
Utah, 1933; that subsequent thereto on the 29th 
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day of August, 1939 the said London Guar-
antee & Accident Company, Ltd., for a valuable 
consideration, executed and delivered to the 
plaintiffs herein a waive.r of said right of sub-
rogation apd an assignment of its said cause 
of action against the said defendant herein, and 
that the plaintiffs are now the owners of said; 
cause of action against the defendants with full 
right to bring and prosecute this action. 
Wherefore, plaintiffs pray judgment against 
the defendant for the sum of $2,950.00 and for 
costs of suit herein and for such other and fur-
ther relief as is deemed meet and equitable in 
the premises 
E. LEROY SHIELDS, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs. 
Duly verified. 
Filed September 2, 1939 
DEMURRER 
(TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSITI). 
And now comes the Cudahy Packing Company, 
a corporation, and demurs to the complaint of 
the plaintiffs on the following grounds, towit: 
L 
That said complaint does not state facts suffi-
cient to constitute a cause of action in favor 
of the plaintiffs and against the defendant. 
2. 
That it appears from ·the facts stated in the 
complaint that whatever right of action, if any, 
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causing the death of Robert J-ohanson, the de-
ceased mentioned in the complaint, is now, and 
ever since the awa.rd of compensation by the 
Industrial Commission of the State of Utah, 
the substance of which award is set forth in 
Paragraph 8 of the plaintiffs' complaint, has 
been vested in the London Guarantee & Acci-
ct:~nt C01npany, Ltd., and not in the plaintiffs, 
and that said plaintiffs have no right, power 
or capacity to institute, prosecute or maintain 
this action against this defendant. 
3. 
That it appears from the facts stated in the 
complaint that the plaintiffs have instituted, 
and now prosecute and maintain, this action, 
not in their own right but as assignees of the 
London Guarantee & Accident Company, Ltd., 
nursnant to a purported assignment dated the 
~9th day of August, 1939, designated in Par-
agraph 8 of the complaint as ''a waiver of said 
right of subrogation and an assignment of its 
said cause of action against the said defendant 
herein;'' that said assignment is in law null, 
void and of no effect; that th~ caus.e of action, 
if any, which existed in favor of the London 
Guarantee & Accident Company, Ltd., and to 
which said companv was in law subrogated, was 
not and is not as~ignable. as a matter of law, 
and that by reason of the facts appearing on 
the face of the complaint the plaintiffs are not 
the owners of the cause of action stated .Qr 
attempted to be stated in the complaint, and 
that neith~r of said plaintiffs has any right 
whatsoever to prosecute or maintain said 
action. 
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8 
Wherefore, . the defendant prays that this de-
murrer be sustained and that it be adjudged 
that the complaint does not s.tate facts suffi-
cient to constitute a cause of action in favor 
of the plaintiffs or either of them and against 
this defendant. 
MARLON E. WILSON, 
Attorney for Defendant. 
CERTIFICATE 
And now comes Mahlon E. Wilson and hereby 
certifies to the court that he is the attorney in 
the above entitled cause; that he has prepared 
and read the foregoing demurrer and that the 
same is well founded in law; and he further 
certifies that said demurrer is served and filed 
in good faith and not for the purpose of hinder-
ing or delaying the prosecution of said action. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 17th day 
of October, A. D., 1939. 
MARLON E. WILSON. 
Filed October 17, 1939 . 
. TUDGM~NT 
(TITLE OF COURT AND. CAUSE). 
This cause came on for hearing on the .... day 
of May, A. D., 1940, before the Honorable M. J. 
Bronson, Judge of said court in the above en-
titled cause, Messrs. E. LeRoy Shields and A. H. 
Hougaard appearing as attorneys ~or the 
plaintiffs, and Messrs. M. E. Wilson and Rob-
ert C. Wilson appearing as attorneys for the 
defendant; and it appearing to the court that 
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an onler had already been n1ade by said court 
in said cause sustaining the defendant's de-
murrer to the complaint of the plaintiffs, and 
giving- the plaintiffs a rig-ht to amend; and it 
being further made to appear to the court that 
the plaintiffs, by their attorneys, do in open 
court decline this right to amend, and refuse 
to plead further and elect to stand upon the 
complaint of the plaintiffs, 
Xow, Therefore, on motion of M. E. Wilson, 
attorney for defendant, it is ordered, adjudged 
and decreed that the plaintiffs take nothing- by 
their action, and that the complaint herein be 
and the same i~ hereby dismissed, and that the 
defendant recover from the plaintif:ffs what-
ever costs, if any, may be taxed according to 
law. 
Done in open court this 17th day of May, A. D. 
1940. 
~L J. BRONSON, Judge. 
Filed ~£ay 17, 1940. 
NOTICE OF APPEA.L 
(TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE). 
To the Cudahy Packing Company, a Corpora-
tion, Defendant Above Named, and to 
M. E. Wilson, Attorney for Said De-
fendant: 
You, and each of you) will please take notice 
that the plaintiffs above named hereby appeal 
to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah from 
~he judgment heretofore entered· on or about 
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the 17th day of May, 1940 in favor of the de-
fend_ant and against the plaintiffs, dismissing 
said plaintiffs' complaint and awarding defend-
ant cOsts against the plaintiffs~ and from the 
whole of said judgment. 
This appeal is taken upon questions of l:ioth 
law and fact. 
E. LEROY SHIELDS, 
A. H. HOUGAARD, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs. 
Received a copy of the foregoing Notice this 
13th day of August, 1940. 
M. E. WILSON. 
Attorney for Defendant. 
~-,iled August 13, 1940. 
ASSIG-NMENTS OF ERROR 
(TITLE OF COURT AND C~t\.USE:}. 
Come now the appellants, Carl Johanson and 
Clara J. Johanson, his wife, and assign the foL 
lowing errors occurring in the trial of this 
cause before the Honorable ~I. J. Bronson, one 
of the judges of said court, upon which said 
errors appellants rely for a reversal of the 
Judgment entered by the court dismissing 
plaintiffs' complaint and awarding to the de-
fendant its costs, and from the order of the 
court sustaining the defendant's demurrer to 
plaintiffs' complaint. 
I. 
The court erred in sustaining thf' defendant's 
demurn~r to plaintiffs' complaint. (Tr. 9). 
II. 
The court erreQ. in dismissing the plaintiffs' 
complaint and awarding judgment to the de-
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fendant for its costs incurred 1n said action. 
(Tr. 11). 
III. 
The court erred in n1aking and rendering its 
judg1nent whereby it was ordered, adjudged 
and decreed that the plaintiffs take nothing, by 
their action; that the complaint of the plair· 
tiffs be dismissed, and that the defendant re-
cover from the plaintiffs whatever costs, if any, 
may be t~xed according to law. (Tr. 13). 
E. LEROY SHIELDS, 
A. H. HOUGAARD~ 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs. 
Received copy of the foregoing Assignments of 
Error thi~ ...... day of September, 1940. 
M. E. WILSON. 
Attorney for Defendant. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs are the 
father and mother of one Robert Johanson, de-
ceased; that the defendant is a corporation trans-
acting its business in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah; that on the 3rd day of June, 1938, said Robert 
,J ohan~on was an employee of the Royal Crysta 1 
Salt Company; that on said day at about the hour of 
7:45 o'clock A. ~L the said Robert J ohaJlson came 
to his death while making delivery of a truck load of 
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salt at the plant of the Cudahy Packing Company; 
that the driver of the truck upon arriving at the 
defendant's yard was directed by an employee of 
the defendant to pass through a certain alleyway 
leading to the defendant's ice plant; tha.t while fol-
lowing these directions and while passing through 
said alleyway to the ice plant the truck came in con-
tact With certain high voltage electric wires which 
had been permitted to sag and become out of repair; 
that the truck came in contact with the wires and 
became charged with a high voltage of electricity; 
that the deceased took hold of the handle of the 
truck door to open the same incident to unloading 
the salt. and was instantly killed by a large voltage 
of electricity passing through his body. It is fur-
ther alleged that the accident arose out of or in the 
course of J ohans.on 's employment with the Salt 
Company, and that his death was caused by the neg~ 
ligent acts of the defendant; that the plaintiffs are 
the mother and father of the deceased and wen~ 
dependent up_on him for their support. 
The complaint also alleges that the plaintiffs applied 
for and were awarded compensation by the Indus-
trial Commission of Utah in the sum of $2500.00; 
that this compensation was paid by the London 
Guarantee & Accident Company, Ltd., the insur-
ance carrier for the Crystal Salt Company, and that 
said insurance company became subrogated to the 
rights of the plaintiffs in their cause of action 
against the defendant, Cudahy Packing Company, 
under and pursuant to the provisions of Section 
42-1-58, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933; that sub-
sequently and on the 29th day of August, 1939, the 
London Guarantee & Accident Company, Ltd., ex-
ecuted and delivered to the plaintiffs a waiver of its 
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13 
rig·ht of ~abrogation and an assignment of its cause 
of action_ 
i:)ection 42-158, Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933, provides : 
\Yhen any injury for which compensation 
is payable under this title shall have been 
cau::5ed by the wrongful act of a third per-
son, the injured employee, or in case of 
death his dependents, may at their option 
rlaim compensation under this title or have 
their action for damages against such third 
person : and, if compensation is claimed and 
a"Tarded the employer or insurance carrier 
haYing paiq the compensation shall be 
~uhrogated to the rights of such employee 
or his dependents to recover against such 
third person; . provided, if such recovery 
shall be in excess of the amount of the com-
pensation awarded and paid, then such ex-. 
cess. less the reasonable expens.os of the 
action, shall be paid to the employee or his 
rl r>pcmdents. 
The plaintiffs exercised their right under thi& se~­
tion of the statute to claim compensation, and hav-
ing been awarded and paid compensation the insur-
ance carrier, London Guarantee & Accident Com-
pany, Ltd., became subrogated to the rights of the 
plaintiffs to recover against the Cudahy Packing 
Company. The rights that the insurance carrier 
had under this section were waived and its cause 
of action assigned to the plaintiff. r.rhe sole ques-
tion on this appeal relates to the right of the plain-
tiff's to maintain this action. 
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ARGUMENT 
The defendant jn thi_s case admits that when the 
London Guarantee & Accident Company, ~td., had 
compensation awarded against it by the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, a cause of action then aros,e in 
its favor against the person negligently causing the 
death of Johanson, hut it contends that Ruch cause 
of action vested in the insurance carrier and was not 
thereafter assignable and that any attempted 
m;signment was not authorized by law. We say that 
the defendant so contends b_ecause Ruch f;ontention 
was made in its brief filed in the District Court. 
It is to be noted, however, that the insurance car-
rier not only assigned its cause of action hut waived 
its right of subrogation. Aside from this assign-
ment and waiver we believe the plaintiffs could 
maintain this action in view of their interest unde1~ 
Section 42-1-58. There is ample authority for this 
position and that the wrongdoer, in this case the 
Cudahy Packing Company, may not question such 
right. 
The statute provides that if recovery (by the ('m-
ployer or insurance carrier) shall be- in excet-'s of. 
the amount of compensation awarded and paid, then 
such excess, less the reasonable expenses of the 
action, shall he pairl to the employee or his depeild-
ents. The purpose of the statute is clear. It wa~ 
without doubt the intention of the legislature that 
the employer or insurance carrier should not profit 
by the injury or death of the employee and that if 
a greater sum was recovered than the amount paid. 
as compensation that this exeess should go to thr. 
employee or his dependents. lTnder f?UCh circum-
stances it would seem that the injured employee or. 
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in the event of his death, the dependents ha.ve such an 
interest in the cause of action that they would be 
proper parties plaintiff. 
It is undoubtedly the law, as arg·ued by the defend-
ant in the lower court, that until Lord CaJnpbell 's 
Act was passed that no remedy was afforded for 
death by wrongful act and that at the present tiine 
such rig·ht exists only as the result of statutory en-
actment. Our statute, Section 104-3-11, provides 
for the maintenance of an actiqn for damages grow_ 
1ng out of the death of an adult person by wrong-
ful act. Under this statute the action may be main-
tained by either the heirs or the- personal repre-
sentativ~ for the benefit of the heirs. In the absence 
of statute it has been quite generally held that the 
cause of action for wrongful death is not assignable. 
This is because the statute creates a cause of action 
for specific persons. In Utah we have a statute, 
Section 42-1-58, \vhich provides that the rights of 
those who may maintain the action are subrogated 
to certain per~ons paying compensation. This cause 
of action exists for a dual purpose under the plain 
provisions of the act. First, to restore to the mn-
ployer or insurance carric•r what it may have paid 
by way of compensation, and second,_ to secure addi-
tional benefits to the dependents. vVe do not be-
lieve the legislature intended to preclude recovery 
against a third person responsible for injury or 
death merely because the person entitled to recover 
had received compensation. The statute 1nakes 
specific provision for the payment of all money to 
the dependents in excess of the amount of compen-
sation paid, and the reasonable expense incident to 
recovery. This clearly indicates the purpose and 
intention that the employee or his dependents shall 
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not be deprived of their right to recover for injury 
or death. 
Who then would have the right to maintain an ac-
tion against the wrongdoer~ Under Section 104-3-11 
this action may be maintained by the heirs or the 
personal representative for the benefit of the heirs. 
Under Section 42-1-58 the employer or insurance 
carrier are subrog]ated to the rights o:i the employee 
or his dependents to recover against the wrongdoer 
and they may maintain an action. If they do not 
desire to exercis.e this right or waive the same, as in 
the case at bar, then there is no reason why other 
pers~ns for whose benefit the statute was passed 
may not do so. These persons, under the statute, 
are the dependents, who in this case are heir:;, tn-
wit, the father and mother of the deceased. They 
would be entitled to maintain the action not only as 
heirs but as dependents and whoRe dependency ha~ 
already been es.ta.blished. Two cases somewhat re-
centlv decided by the Supreme Court of the United 
Rtates are interesting upon the subject. They do 
not involve the question of subrogation of assign-
ment but do involve a consideration of who may 
maintain the action where compensation has been 
pa.id and -recovery is sought against a third party 
wrongdoer responsible for death. 
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Moses, 287 
U. S. 530; 77 L. Ed. 477; 88 A. L. R 
647 
Doleman v. Levine, 295 U. S. 221; 79 L. Ed 
1402. 
In the Aetna case, the widow of an employee who 
was killed in the course of his employment. and who 
was also the administratrix and the sole beneficiary 
under both t!1p compensation and thP. wrongful 
death acts, elected to receive compensation. It was 
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conceded that the widow before her election to take 
compensation wa~ alone entitled to the benefit of 
the \\'rongful Death Act and the lluestion was who, 
in consequence of her election was the proper plain-
tiff to bring the action. 'rhe Court held in con-
struing Section 33 of the (District of Columbia) 
Compensatio_n Act, that since the transfer of her 
entire interest was effected by the act the employer 
was entitled to maintain the suit against the wrong-
doer in his own name without the necessity of su1ng 
in the nan1e of the administratrix. It is contended 
by the defendant in that case that the employer 
could not maintain the action. 
In the Doleman case, supra, the Court again con-
strued the District Compensation Act and held that 
where the right of the dependent, to which the dm~ 
ployer is subrogated by Section 33 (h), d_eclaring 
that acceptance of compensation shall operate as 
an assignment to the employer of all right of the 
person entitled to compensation to recover damages 
against third persons, there is transferred to the 
employer, in case of acceptance of compensation, 
only such rights as the dependents electing to re-
ceive com pen sa tion otherwise would have to share 
in the benefits of the Wrongful Death Act, the em-
ployer being entitlerl to maintain suit if such de-
pendents are entitled to the whole recovery. and. if 
their int~rest is less than the whole. being entitled 
to receive their share in the proceeds of recovery, 
. and. if necessary, to compel the administrntor t0 
hrin9.' suit and account for the proceeds. 
The District Compensation Act. construerl by the 
Rupreme Conrt of thP United States (Section 33 of 
the act appears in a footnote to the case) provided 
that ''acceptance of such compensation shall oper~ 
atr ns an :1~signmenf. to the employer of all right of 
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the person entitled to compensation to recover dam-
ages against such third person."'' The act further 
provides that the employer shall pay any excess to 
the person entitled to compensation or to the rep-
resentative. In the_ .. a.etna case, the Supreme Court 
said that the employer could maintain the action 
because the entire recovery would pass to the per-
son who had received compensation. In the Dole-
man case it held the employer could not maintain 
the action because there may be next of kin of the 
decedent entitled to share in the recovery for wrong_ 
ful death and who were not entitled to compensation 
and others who elected to take their share of the 
recovery for wrongful death instead of compensa-
tion. The Supreme Court thus concludes its opin-
ion in the Doleman case: 
"Vv e conclude that where the employer is 
given anything to recover by a suit brought 
directly against the wrongdoer, it is the full 
recovery to which the injured employee or 
his personal representative would be en-
titled. See Aetna L. Ins. Co. v. Moses, 
supra (287 U. S. 540; 77 L. Ed. 481; 53 S. 
Ct. 231; 88 A. L. R. 647). But where the 
right of the dependent, to which the em-
ployer is suhrog'ated by and 33 (h), is only 
to a share of the proceeds of the recovery, 
the employer is not authorized to maintain 
the action for wrongful death.'' 
These two decisions decide when the employer rna: 
or- may not maintain the suit, in view of the pro 
visions of the District of Columbia statute. N' 
consideration is given to the effect of a. waiver o 
the employer's right of subrogation or his assigJ 
ment of the cause of action. The District statut 
differs from the Utah statute in that the Distri< 
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statute says that acceptance of compensation oper-
ates as an assignment to the en1ployer while the 
Utah statute says that if compensation is claimed 
and awarded the employer or insurance carrier 
"shall be subrogated to the rights of such employee 
or his dependents to recover against such third 
person.'' 
We think that the en1ployer or insurance carrier 
may waiv~ their right of subrogation and when 
waived there is no impediment to the heirs or de-
pendents bringing the action. Such ri2;ht is not 
necessarily based upon an assignment of the cause 
of action and without such assignment leaves the 
right to maintain the action as it exists under Sec-
tion 104-3-11, not as a new cause of action but a 
cause of action recognized by this section and ampli-
fied and extended by the provisions of 42-1-58. But, 
the insurance carrier in the case at bar not only 
waived its right of subrogation but assig11ed the 
cause of action to the plaintiffs. The effectiveness 
of the assignment is challenged by the defenrlant. 
upon the gJround that the cause of action for wrong-
ful death under 104-3-11 for the benefit of certain 
designated person~, cannot be assigned and that 
Section 42-1-58 in effect creates a new cause of ac-
tion for wrongful de·ath in other persons, towit, the 
employer or insurance carrier. and that these per-
sons so designated are ·without right to makP ::1 
la:\vful assignment. This contenUon overlooks thP-
f~wt that under Section 42-1-58 no provision is n1ad~~ 
for assignment but merely suhroga.tes the PmployP1" 
or insurance carrier to the rig"hts of the employee 
or dependents. Because of such subrogation thP 
rio-ht as it exists under 104-3-11 is not taken away h1~~ th~ l'~"overv wbPn made iR designated for th~ 
henefit of thP dependPnts instead of the heirs. 
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We call the Court's attention to 
Sections 1590-1605, 71 C. J., Title Work-
men's Compensation Acts. 
The effect and purpose of a provision for subroga-
tion is discussed in Section 1590. It is said in Sec-
tion 1590 that a provision for subrogation to the 
rights of an injured employee against a third person 
is for the benefit of the employer or insurer; that 
such provision is not intended for the benefit of 
the negligent third person and does not relieve him 
rfrom liability. If the employer's rights are pro-
tected, the third person may not object to the main-
tenance of an action by the employee and that an 
action by the insurer who pays compensation is for 
the benefit of both insurer and the employee under 
some of the acts. 
In Section 1591 distinctions are noted between causes 
of action which are assigned and those where rights 
are subrogated by statute, and it points out tliat 
where an assignment to the employer pursuant to 
the act has once become effective, title to the cause 
of action so vested may not be divested without the 
employer's consent, either by the employee or by 
the Industrial Commission. 
In Section 1593, speaking of similar provisions in 
compensation statutes, it is Raid that if cmnpensa-
tion js claiu1Nl and awarded or paid under the Act 
the employer or insurance carrier n1ay enforce for 
his benefit the liability of a person other than thP 
employer and does not take away common law right~ 
from anyone but merely declares how the right shall 
be regulated with respect to its use; that they do 
not create new causes of action. 
Considering the effect of the substitution where it 
is considered as an assignment, or the assignment 
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where the statute Inakes such provision, and con-
sidering the same in relation to transfer of the en-
tire interest, it is said in Section 1594 that it has 
been recognized that the entire cause of action may 
be transferred, but under a provision that the re-
ceipt of co-mpensation shall operate as an assign-
ment to an employer or insurer to the extent of the 
liability of the employer to the employee occasioned 
by the injury, there is then only a partial assign-
ment, and that the view has been taken that a pro-
\~ision for subrogation does not effect a transfer to 
the employer of the entire cause of action of thP 
employee. 
Black v. Chicago Great Western R. Co., 17 + 
N. W. 774. 
It is said in ~ection 1601 that where the act effects 
the assignment of the cause of action, questions as 
to whether a cause of action in tort is assignable~ 
and as to the consent of the debtor or tort-feasor, 
and rules against a splitting of causes of action, if 
the act provides for a partial assignment, yield to 
the provisions of the act, and in Section 1602, that 
where under the act the employee or dependents of 
the deceaf'ed employee have a beneficial interest in 
the amount recoverable from such person, if such 
amount is more than sufficient to indemnify the 
employer or insurer, nRually the right of the em-
ployer or insurer 'vho is entitled to subrogation 
under the act is not exclusive and the employee, or, 
jn the ca~e of the dePth of the employee, the depend-
ent~, or the personal representative of the employee 
may sue as a real party in interest. It is further 
f~rrid that under a nrovision for the subrogation of 
the emr·loyer the YlPW has b-een taken, however, that 
the right of the employee (this undoubtedlv in-
tended tn the employrr) to hring an action is ex-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
elusive until the employer neglects or refuses to 
bring the action, and prior to such neglect and re-
fusal, the employee may not sue, but if the employer 
refuses to sue then the employee may sue in his 
own behalf. 
We submit that where the employer or insurance 
carrier, having paid compensation neglects or re-
fuses to _sue, or, where, as here, the insurance car-
rier waives his right of subrogation, then the em-
ployee or the dependents of the deceased employee 
may bring the action. If this we~e not true then 
th~ employer or insurance carrier, by secret agree-
ments and understandings or by neglect, could de-
feat the employee or dependents of" rights against 
wrongdoers, which the s.tatute contemplates shall 
jnur~ to their benefit. Certainly the right of sub-
rogation given to the employer or insurance ear-
tier by our statute is for their benefit and may be 
waived. It. is said in 
Section 1603, C. J., supra, 
that the benefit of or rights acquired undPr pro-
visions of the general type here considered may be 
waivQd hy the employer or insurer, or lost by es,top-
~el, and if by any agreement between the employr.r 
and the employee the right to bring an action against 
the to-rt-feasor is left with the employee thP. tort-
feasor may not complain. 
Thomas v. Otis El~vator Co., 172 N. W. 53. 
Prior to the 1933 revision of the Utah statute it 
was provided, 
Laws of Utnh 1921, Chapter 67, 
that the cause of action against the third person 
should be assignable, whether for injury or death, 
and the dependents or the personal representative 
and nt:lt the heirs were given the right to make a 
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full and exclusive assignment. The apparent in-
tention of this statute was to make it possible to 
assign a. cause of action arising· out of negligent in-
jury or \\Tongful death so that the employer or de-
pendents could recover ag,ainst a tort-feasor. There 
is certainly no apparent intention by th~ 1933 re-
vision to lessen this right. The legislature did away 
with the language relating to assignments and sub--
rogated thP. person paying compensation to thf;J 
rights of the dependents to the ext~mt that compen .. 
sation was paid. Under the 1921 statute this Court 
held in 
Robinson Y. Industrial Comrnission, 2n9 P. 
513; 66 A. L. R. 1343; 72 Utah 203-. 
that as~ignn1ent of the cause of action vvas neces-
sary and a condi_tion precedent to the payment of 
compen!Sation. 
A great many cases have been decided relating to 
the right of the employer, the employee and the in-
surance carrier to recover against third persrms. 
It would unduly prolong this brief to attempt a re-
view of the many cases which have passed upon 
this que?tion or an analysis of the various r-:.tatutory 
provisioPs. The cases are reviewed in annotations 
in A. L. R. as follows: 
19 A. L. R. 766. 
27 A. L. R. 493. 
37 A. L. R. 83~. 
88 A L. R. 665, and 
106 A. L. R. 1040. 
The general tre-nd of th~ majority of tlw cases if> 
to the eff~ct that the compensation a.et does :'\Ot take 
away the right of the employee or his dependents to 
recover against an offending thhd person, even 
though c01npensation has been paid. The right of 
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the employer or insurance carrier to recover back 
what has been paid by way of cornpensation has 
quite gen~rally been upheld under most oi the 
statutes. 
The right to assign a cause of action arising out 
of the negligence of a third person has quite gen-
erally been uph~ld. 
lVIcGarbey v. Independent Oil & Gas Co. 
146 N. W. 895. 
Saudek v. Milwaukee Electric R. & Light 
Co., 157 N. W. -579. 
Frankfort Gen. Ins. Co. v. Milwaukee .. 159 
N. W. 581. 
Ridley v. United Sash & Door Co. {Okla.), 
224 P. 351. 
In the Oklahoma case it was held that an employer 
or insurance carrier who has been compelled to pay 
compensation to an employee because of inJury re-
ceived as a result of the negligence of a third pei.'-
son may assign the right of action against such 
negligent third person, and, where such assignment 
is made by the employer to the injured employee, 
who thereupon sues upon .said assignment, the limit 
of recovery is the amount to which such employer 
was subrog:ated, together with legal interest there-
l(}n from the date of subrogation. 
;The Oklahon1a statute provided that if the employee 
elected to take compensation the cause of a.ction 
against the third person shall be assigned to the 
~nsnrance carrier liable for the payment of com-
pensation, and if the employee elected to proceed 
against such other person or insurance carrier, as 
the case may be, the insurance carrier shall con·· 
tribute only the deficiency, if any, between the 
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amount of recovery ag,ainst such other person and 
the compensation provided or estin1ated by the act 
in such case. 
The essential point in the case is the fact that it 
was held that the cause of action was assignable 
back to the employee by the insurance carrier who 
paid the compensation and that such employee 
could maintain the action. In 
Globe Indemnity Co. v. Taye Bros., 129 So. 
234, 
it was held that a provision of the compensation act 
that payments due under the act should not be as-
signable, was held to refer to claims for payments 
due to the employee under the act and not to pre-
vent an assignment by an insurance carrier of the 
employer's claim against a third person whose neg--
lig-ence caused an injury to an employee. 
This Court held in 
Industrial Commission v. \Yas.atch Grading 
Co., ... Utah ... ; 14 P. (2d) 988. 
thR.t an employee injured by the negligence of a 
third -party would not lose his right to commence 
his action against such party until he had, under 
the compensation act. acquired a right to conlpen-
sation, and that he was not divested of the right 
to maintain the action until he had assigned it, and 
that, before such assignment he was the real party 
in interest and was entitled to maintain an action 
against a third party tort-fea~or. 
This case was decided before the 1933 revision of 
our statute at which time assignment was a condi-
tion precedent to a claim for compensation. If, 
under the 1921 law, the employee or his dependents 
were the rPn] parties in interest, "he, or his depend-
ents would ~till be the real parties in interest f0r the 
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purpose of recovery against a third party wrong· 
doer. Under our 
Survival Statute, Section 102-11-5, 
no specific provision is made for the survival of 
actions gro~ng out of torts causing damage to 
property yet it was determined by this Court in 
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. D. & R. G. 
Ry. Co., (Utah), 137 P. 653, 
that a claim by the owner of property negligently 
destroyed by a railroad company, for damages for 
its destruction is assignable, and that an insurance 
company receiving an assignment of the property 
owner's claim for such damages against the rail-
road company was the real party in interest so as 
to entitle it to sue on such assignment in its own 
name. Upon this same subject we invite the Court's 
attention to the following cases: 
Martell v. Kutcher, 216 N. W. 522. 
Swanson v. Lake Superior Ter. & Trans. 
R. Co., 219 N. W. 274. 
Two recent cases, 
Moseley v. Lily Ice Cream Co. (Ariz.); 300 
P. 958, and 
I{andelin v. Lee Moor Contracting Co. 
(N.1I.) :24 P. (2'd) 731, 
consider the question in the light of varying stat-
utes and decisions. In the Arizona case the statute 
was in the following language: 
1435. ''Liability of third person to injured 
employee. If an employee entitled to com-
pensation hereunder is injured or killed by 
th~ negligence or wrong of another not in 
the same employ, such injured employee, or 
in case of death, his dependents, shall elect 
whether to take compensation under this 
title or to pursue his remedy against such 
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other. If he elect to take con1pensation, tne 
cause of action against such other shall be 
a:-;~1gued to the ~tate for the benefit of the 
compensation fund, or to the person liable 
for the payinent thereof, and if he elect to 
proceed against such other, the compensa-
tion fund or person, shall contribute only 
the deficiency between the amount actually 
collected and the compensation provided or 
estilnatcd herein for such case. Compro-
mise of any such cause of action by the em-
ployee or his dependents at an amount less 
than the compensation provided for herein 
shall be made only within the written 
approval of the cmnmission, or of the per-
son liable to pay the same.'' 
The .._1\.rizona Court held under the provisions of this 
statute that where the employee injured by a third 
person elects to take compensation all his rights 
against the third person pass, as a matter of law, 
to the State. The Arizona Court classifies the de-
cisions and statutes in the United States on this 
subject into three groups. It was held that the 
Arizona statute comes under the third class of stat~ 
utes, and that where the employee has elected to 
take compensation and the awarding of such com~ 
pensation by the terms of the statute effects an as-
signment of the cause of action, then acceptance of 
compensation bars any action by or on behalf or 
the employee. This would be similar to the Uhlh 
statute as it existed when the Robinson case was 
decided by this Court. 
Under a different statute, and one that in many re .. 
spects is similar to the Utah Act, the Supreme Court 
of N p"· '.f exi<'o jn the K~mdelin case, supra, says: 
"The first (statute) includes those where 
the express right is given to the employee 
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to recover compensation and also to sue the 
third party for negligence. Typical of such 
statutes are those of New Jersey, Kansas, 
California., and lowa, and the decisions in 
these and other States with like statutes 
hold accordingly that acceptance of conl-
pensation does not defeat the right of the 
injured employee to bring a suit against 
such third party. (Citing cases) · 
''The second class of statutes does not ex-
pressly give the employee the right to re-
eover compensation and to sue the third 
party, but provides that, if compensation is 
paid, the errtployer is subrogated to the 
rights of the employee so far as the amount 
which he has paid is concerned, but that 
any surplus he may recover is to go to the 
injured employee. In these States it is gen-
erally held that the right of action against 
the third party still exists, notwithstand-
ing compensation has been paid, and that in 
some way or another either by bringing 
suit in the name of -the employer or in hls 
own name, the employee may maintain the 
action. Typical of these States is Texas. 
(Citing cases). 
The third class of statutes provides that 
if the employee elects to bring suit against 
the third person and his recovery is less 
than that granted by the Compensation 
Act, the insurance fund shall make up the 
difference, but that if the employee elects 
to take compensation, the awarding of com-
pensation ~hall act as an assignment of the 
cause of action to the State for the benefit 
of the insurance fund, or other insurer. In 
these States acceptance of compensation 
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bars any action against the third person 
by or on behalf of the employee. Typical 
statutes are those of Kew York, Or~gon 
and Oklahoma. (Citing cases). 
On comparison with many statutes of these 
three classes, it is apparent that the New 
Mexico law falls within the first or second 
class. We quote McArthur v. Dutee ·w. 
Flint Oil Co., Inc. (1929), 50 R. I. 226; 
146 A. 484, 486, as affording a satisfactory 
interpretation of a statute similar to ours.'' 
The New l\Iexico statute which forms the basis of 
the foregoing conclusion, reads as follows: 
'• Section 20 of Article 3, Chapter 92, G. L. 
1923, provides as follows·: 'Where the in-
jury for which compensation is payable 
under this chapter was caused under cir-
cumstances creating a legal liability in sonte 
person other· than the employer to pay .dam-
ages in respect thereof, the employee may 
take proceedings both against that person 
to recover damages and against any per-
son liable for such compenosation, but shall 
not be entitled to receive both damages 
and compensation; and if th~ employee has 
been paid conipensa tion under this chapter, 
thP person by whom the compensation was 
paid shall be entitled to indemnity from. 
the person so liable to pay rlfl.mag-es fiS 
aforf'said, and, to tl1e extent of !7mch indem-
nity. shall he snhrog-atPd to the rig-hts of 
the employee to recover damag-es there-
for'.'' 
The New Mexico statute is substantially the same 
as the Utah statute insofar as givin~ to the employee 
an election to take compensation or proceed against: 
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the third party tort- feasor. The New Mexico Act 
says the employee may take proceedings both 
against that person to recover damages and against 
any person liable to pay compensation, '' but shalt 
not be entitled to receive both damages and C01tl-
pensation.'' r~rhe statute then gives to the person 
paying compensation the right to be indemnified 
from the person liable to pay damages ''and to the 
extent of such indemwity shall be subrogated to the 
rights of the employee to recover damages there-
for." 
The purpose of the New Mexico sta.tute and the 
Utah statute seems to be identical; that is to say, 
in the event injury is caused by the wrongful or 
negligent aet of a third person, the employer or in-
surer may be reimbursed for the amount paid as 
compensation and the injured employee or his de-
pendents may recover for loss occasioned in excess 
of compensation paid. The employer or insurance 
carrier recovers as a damage to a property right 
arising by operation of law under the statute. 'rhe 
employee recovers as a damag:e to person. In either 
event, the employer or insurance carrier and the 
employee are real parties in interest and entitled 
to maintain the action. Under neither statute could 
it be said that it was the intention of the legislature 
to deprive the employee or his dC'pendents from 
maintaining his action to recover damages, especial-
ly in view of the manifest purpose and intention of 
the statute to provide additional benefits to th~ 
employee or hiR dependents against the wrongfnl 
or negligent act of third persons. If the right of 
subrogation was not provided for by the statute, 
there would he no question about the right of the 
employee or his dependents to bring an action to 
recover damages nnd such right of subrogation 
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being proYided for the benefit of the employer, his 
right thereto 1nay be waived. Such was the holding 
in the case of 
Foster v. Co~ess Square Hotel Uo., 14fi 
Atl. 400; 67 A. L. R. 239, 
in which case it was held under a similar sta.tute 
that the failure of the elnployer or compensation 
insurer in interest to pursue his remedy against the 
third party within the 90 day period pr9vided by 
the act shall entitle the beneficiary or his repre-
sentatives to enforce the liability in their own name, 
and that the employer by such failure or neglect 
waives the rig·ht of subrogation. And in 
Fournier v. Great Atl. -& Pac. T. Co., 14-R 
Atl. 147; 68 A. L. R. 481, 
it was held under the same statute that when an 
employer by paying or becoming liable for work-
men's compensation to an injured empJoyee has be-
come subrogated by virtue of the provisions of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act to the injured em-
ployee's right of action ag1ninst a third person, 
whose act or omission caused the injury, action may 
be broug-ht against such person either in the name 
of the e1nploycr or in the name of the employee. To 
the same effect is 
Theby v. Wisconsin Power & Li.u:ht Com-
pany, 222 N. W. 826. 
The Supreme Court of Nebraska in 
Muncaster v. Graham Ice Cream Co., 1-::! 
N. W. 52, 
· held rmder the Nebraska statute that the legislature 
intended beyond question to give' to fhe injured em-
ployee a rig·ht of action where the injury eomplained 
of grew out of carelessness or negligence of a third 
party, and that the employee has the right to main-
tain SlH'~l a suit. The provisions of the Nebraska 
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statute, however, do not appear in the opinion, but 
we submit that unleHs there is some definite pur-
pose or intention indicated by the statute which 
precludes such right, and where the employer or 
insurance carrier have either waived their right of 
E!ubrogation or have assigned such right or have 
neglected to prosecute an action or refused to pros-
ecute the same, that the employee or his depend-
ents ar~ not deprived of their right to maintain the 
action. In the case of 
0 'Brien v. Chicago City Railway Company. 
137 N. E. 214, 
the Court held tha.t in case of injury to an employee 
by a stranger not bound by the provisions of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act, the injured em-
ployee is not put to his election between compensa-
tion under the statute and damages at common law, 
but may prosecute the common law action and stat~ 
utory claim for compensation at the same tinw 
The cases which hold the cause of action assignable 
by the employer or insurance carrier who have paid 
compensation, do not always assign the reason for 
such holding. In California the rule has been estab-
lished, as in Utah, that claims for damages for per~ 
sonal injuries grmving out of torts such as assaults, 
slander, malicious prosecution or fal~e imprison-
ment may not be assigned, but injuries to property 
may be assigned, 
Stalev v. McClurken, 96 P. (2d} 805. 
but the California Court held, as has the Utah 
Court, that injuries to property may be assign·~d 
and that the distinction between assignable and 
non-as~:ignable causes arising in torts is determined 
by survivorship of the action after the death of the 
injured party; that if _the claim survives the deat~ 
of the party, it is assignable, but if it expires with 
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his death, it is not assig-nable. ~his, we think, is 
the general rule in most jurisdictions, but the Cali-
fornia rule establishes the fnet that the action for 
injury to property does survive the death of the 
owner thereof, and therefore an action for injury to 
the property g-rowing out of a tort may be pros-
ecuted by his representatives or by his assignee. 
To the same effect is 
Jackson v. Deanbille Holding Company, 27 
P. (2d) 643. 
In the case of 
Morris v. Standard Oil Company, (Calif.), 
252 P. 605, 
the California Court recogmized this rule as author-
izing the assignment of a cause of action growing 
out of an injury to an employee. In thjs case, one 
:f\forris was seriously injured hy a truck opPrat.ed 
by the Standard Oil Company while in the course 
of his employment by the Chronicle Publishing Cmn-
pany. The employee brought an action against the 
Oil Company for damages and recovered $12,000.00. 
The action was defended by the Ocean Accident & 
Guaranty Comp~ny, which company was the insur-
ance carrier of both the Oil Company ~nd Morris's 
employer. The ipsurance company supplied Ined-
ical aid to the employee and paid him disability ben-
efits. When Morris brought his suit against the Oil 
Company, neither the employer nor its insurance 
carrier were joined in the action and neither in-
stituted a separate action. Under the c~11ifornia 
statute, the insurance earrier became subrog-ated to 
the rights of the employer and was entitled to en-
force such rights in its own name. The statute in 
this respect provided that when an employer is in-
sured against liability for compensation "'ith an 
insurance rarrier and sne'h carrier shall have paid 
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any compensation for which the employer is liable 
or furnished or provided any medical service~ re-
quired by the act, such insurance carrier shall be 
subrogated to all the rights of the employer and may 
enforce such rights in its own name. 'rhe insurance 
carrier petitioned for a lien against the judgment 
obtained by the employee for the amount which it 
had expended, which lien was granted upon the 
condition, however, that it assign to the employep, 
any and all claims, demands or causes of action it 
might have against the company for the amount 
paid by it to the employee. Subsequently, there was 
a settlement of the controversy and the Oil Com-
pany retained and presumably paid to the insur-
ance company the sum of $800.64 of the amount 
agreed to be paid by the Oil Company to the em-
ployee in satisfaction of the judgment. The Oil 
Company then refused to ackno·wledge the legality 
of the assignment or to pay the amount assigned, 
and tl1r employee as assignee instituted this suit, 
setting up the assignment and basing his cause of 
action thereon. In passing upon the legality of the 
assignment, the Supreme Court of California says: 
''The cause of action here assigned is not 
one arising in fa~'nr of the employE;e by rea-
son of his injurie~ ... 1111t out of the obligation 
imposed by the \Vorkmen 's Compensation 
Act on the Oil Company which cau..;ed a 
property injury to the employer, to re-
imburse the employer or its subrogated in-
surance carrier for the amount of disahiJ-
it:v indemnity paid the emplo~ree '' 
Any right conferred by statute upon the employer 
or insurance carrier by reason of the payment of 
the compensation to an injured employee or hi~ 
dependents is a rif-!·ht arising by operation of la'v 
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and could be nothing more than a property right. 
If a property right then under the decision of the 
California Court and the decision of this Court in 
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. D. & R. G. 
Ry. Co., supra. 
the cause of action was assignable, and the employee 
would be entitled to maintain the action to the ex-
tent of recovering at least the 3mount that his 
assignor was damaged in such property right. The 
California statute seems to be different from most 
statutes in that the right of subrogation passes to 
the insurance carrier from the employer and the 
employer's right would be limited to the mnonnt 
paid as compensation. 
We respectfully submit that a reasonable construc-
tion of our statute as it has existed since the 1933 
revision should be construed so as to permit thP. 
employee- or his dependents to maintain his action 
against any third person by whose wrong£ul or neg_ 
ligent conduct the employee has been injured or 
his dependents suffered a loss by reason of the 
death of such. employee, and that the statute con-
temp•lates such an interest in the employee or his 
dependents as to-n1ake said persons the real partie~ 
in interest. That while the statute seems to con-
template that the mnployer or insurance carrier may 
maintain the action against such third party for 
the entire damage growing out of the injury or· 
death of the employee, yet the beneficial interest 
in such recovery is limited by the amount paid as 
compensation, and that such interest is purely n 
property right subject to assignment and upon 
assignment, as in the case at bar. the employee may 
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maintain his action for the entire loss suffered by 
the negligent or wrongful act of such third person. 
That the right recognized by the statute in the em-
ployer or insurance carrier is subject to be waived 
or assigned and that where the employer or insur-
ance carrier for a reasonable pericd fails or neglects 
to bring the action or waives its right of subroga-
tion or assigns, then such action may be brought by 
the employee to preserve and protect the benefits 
intended by the statute to pass to the en;ployee or 
his dependents, and we submit that in view of the 
authorities upon this question and a const_ruction 
of the statute in confonnity with the evident pur-
pos.es of the legislature, the order of the District 
Court sustaining tlie defendant's demurrer and 
dismissing plaintiffs' complaint should be reversed, 
and the District Court ordered to overrule the de-
murrer, and require the defendant to answer. 
Respectfully submitted> 
E. LEROY SHIELDS AND 
A. H. HOUGAARD, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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